National Transportation Safety Board	NTS	SB ID:	DCA02MA00	)1	Aircraft Registration Number: N14053				
FACTUAL REPORT	e Date: 11/12	2/2001	Most Critical Injury: Fatal						
AYIATIQN	Occ	currence	<sub>Type:</sub> Accid	lent	Investigated By: NTSB				
Location/Time									
Nearest City/Place	State	Zip	Code Local Time		Time Zone				
Belle Harbor	NY	116	694	0916	EST				
Airport Proximity: Off Airport/Airstrip	rom La	nding Facility:		Direction From	m Airport	i:			
Aircraft Information Summary									
Aircraft Manufacturer		Model/Series	3		Type of Aircraft				
Airbus Industrie		A300B4-60	5R		Airplane				
						,			

Air Medical Transport Flight: No

Narrative

Sightseeing Flight: No

Brief narrative statement of facts, conditions and circumstances pertinent to the accident/incident:

The Board's full report is available at http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/publictn.htm.

On November 12, 2001, about 0916:15 eastern standard time, American Airlines flight 587, an Airbus Industrie A300-605R, N14053, crashed into a residential area of Belle Harbor, New York, shortly after takeoff from John F. Kennedy International Airport (JFK), Jamaica, New York. Flight 587 was a regularly scheduled passenger flight to Las Americas International Airport, Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, with 2 flight crewmembers, 7 flight attendants, and 251 passengers aboard the airplane. The airplane's vertical stabilizer and rudder separated in flight and were found in Jamaica Bay, about 1 mile north of the main wreckage site. The airplane's engines subsequently separated in flight and were found several blocks north and east of the main wreckage site. All 260 people aboard the airplane and 5 people on the ground were killed, and the airplane was destroyed by impact forces and a postcrash fire. Flight 587 was operating under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 121 on an instrument flight rules flight plan. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident.

The accident airplane arrived at JFK about 2231 on the night before the accident. The airplane had been flown from San Jose, Costa Rica, to JFK with an intermediate stop in Miami International Airport, Miami, Florida. During postaccident interviews, the pilots of the flight leg from MIA to JFK indicated that the flight was smooth and uneventful.

Flight 587 was the first leg of a 1-day roundtrip sequence for the flight crew. American Airlines records indicated that the captain checked in for the flight about 0614 and that the first officer checked in about 0630. The gate agent working the flight arrived at the departure gate about 0645. She stated that the flight attendants were already aboard the airplane at that time and that the captain and the first officer arrived at the gate about 0700.

About 0710, the airplane fueling process began. The airplane fueler indicated that, during the fueling process, he saw one of the pilots perform an exterior inspection of the airplane. He finished the fueling process about 0745 and stated that he saw nothing unusual regarding the airplane.

Statements provided to the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey Police Department by American Airlines maintenance and avionics personnel indicated that, sometime between 0730 and 0800, the captain reported that the number 2 pitch trim and yaw damper system would not engage. Two avionics technicians were sent to the airplane to investigate the problem. They performed an auto flight system (AFS) check, which indicated a fault with the number 2 flight augmentation computer. The circuit breaker was then reset, another AFS check was performed, and no fault was detected. In

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Narrative (Continued)

addition, an autoland system check was performed, and that test also did not detect a fault. The avionics technicians estimated that they were in the cockpit for 5 to 7 minutes.

The cockpit voice recorder (CVR) recording began about 0845:35. The CVR indicated that, about 0859:58, the airplane was cleared to push back from the gate. About 0901:33, the ground controller provided the flight crew with taxi instructions to runway 31L, and the first officer acknowledged these instructions. About 0902:05, the captain told the first officer, "your leg, you check the rudders." (The first officer was the flying pilot, and the captain was the nonflying pilot.) Data from the flight data recorder (FDR) showed that, about 0902:07, the rudder pedal check began. The FDR data also showed that a maximum right rudder pedal deflection of about 3.7 inches was recorded about 0902:11 and that a maximum left rudder pedal deflection of 3.6 inches was recorded about 0902:19. About 0902:23, the first officer responded, "rudders check." The FDR data showed that the rudder pedals returned to their neutral position about 0902:25.

About 0906:53, the ground controller provided the pilots of Japan Air Lines flight 47, a Boeing 747-400, with taxi instructions to runway 31L. About 0908:01, the ground controller instructed the Japan Air Lines pilots to contact the local (tower) controller. About 0908:58, the ground controller instructed the flight 587 pilots to follow the Japan Air Lines airplane and to contact the local controller. The first officer acknowledged this instruction.

About 0911:08, the local controller cleared the Japan Air Lines airplane for takeoff. About 0911:36, the local controller cautioned the flight 587 pilots about wake turbulence and instructed the pilots to taxi into position and hold for runway 31L. The first officer acknowledged the instruction. About 0913:05, the local controller instructed the Japan Air Lines pilots to fly the bridge climb and to contact the departure controller at the New York Terminal Radar Approach Control (TRACON). About 0913:21, the flight 587 captain said to the first officer, "you have the airplane."

About 0913:28, the local controller cleared flight 587 for takeoff, and the captain acknowledged the clearance. About 0913:35, the first officer asked the captain, "you happy with that [separation] distance?" About 3 seconds later, the captain replied, "we'll be all right once we get rollin'. He's supposed to be five miles by the time we're airborne, that's the idea." About 0913:46, the first officer said, "so you're happy."

The National Transportation Safety Board's airplane performance study for this accident0 determined that flight 587 started its takeoff roll about 0913:51 and lifted off about 0914:29, which was about 1 minute 40 seconds after the Japan Air Lines airplane. About 0914:43, the local controller instructed the flight 587 pilots to turn left, fly the bridge climb, and contact the New York TRACON departure controller. About 5 seconds later, the captain acknowledged this instruction. Radar data indicated that the airplane climbed to 500 feet above mean sea level (msl) and then entered a climbing left turn to a heading of 220. About 0915:00, the captain made initial contact with the departure controller, informing him that the airplane was at 1,300 feet msl and climbing to 5,000 feet msl. About 0915:05, the departure controller instructed flight 587 to climb to and maintain 13,000 feet msl, and the captain acknowledged this instruction about 5 seconds later. About 0915:29, the CVR recorded the captain's statement "clean machine," indicating that the gear, flaps, and slats had all been retracted.

About 0915:35, flight 587 was climbing through 1,700 feet msl with its wings approximately level. About 1 second later, the departure controller instructed flight 587 to turn left and proceed direct to the WAVEY navigation intersection (located about 30 miles southeast of JFK). About 0915:41, the captain acknowledged the instruction. The controller did not receive any further transmissions from flight 587.

FDR data indicated that, about 0915:36, the airplane experienced a  $0.04~\mathrm{G}$  drop in longitudinal load factor, a  $0.07~\mathrm{G}$  shift to the left in lateral load factor, and about a  $0.3~\mathrm{G}$  drop in normal

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Narrative (Continued)

(vertical) load factor. The airplane performance study found that these excursions were consistent with a wake turbulence encounter. Between 0915:36 and 0915:41, the FDR recorded movement of the control column, control wheel, and rudder pedals. Specifically, the control column moved from approximately 0 (neutral) to 2 nose up, 2 nose down, and back to 0; the control wheel moved a total of seven times, with peaks at 18 right, 30 left, 37 right, 34 left, 5 left, 21 left, and 23 right, before moving to between 5 and 6 left; and the rudder pedals moved from about 0.1 inch left (the starting point for the pedals) to about 0.1 inch right and 0.2 inch left before moving to 0.1 inch left. The airplane performance study indicated that, during this time, the rudder moved from 0 (neutral) to about 2 left, about 0.6 right, and back to 0.

During the wake turbulence encounter, the airplane's pitch angle increased from 9 to 11.5, decreased to about 10, and increased again to 11. The airplane's bank angle moved from 0 (wings level) to 17 left wing down, which was consistent with the turn to the WAVEY navigation intersection.

At 0915:44.7, the captain stated, "little wake turbulence, huh?" to which the first officer replied, at 0915:45.6, "yeah." At 0915:48.2, the first officer indicated that he wanted the airspeed set to 250 knots, which was the maximum speed for flight below 10,000 feet msl. At that point, the airplane was at an altitude of about 2,300 feet msl.

FDR data indicated that, about 0915:51, the load factors began excursions that were similar to those that occurred about 0915:36: the longitudinal load factor dropped from 0.20 to 0.14 G, the lateral load factor shifted 0.05 G to the left, and the normal load factor dropped from 1.0 to 0.6 G. The airplane performance study found that these excursions were also consistent with a wake turbulence encounter. According to the FDR, the airplane's bank angle moved from 23 to 25 left wing down at 0915:51.5, the control wheel moved to 64 right at 0915:51.5, and the rudder pedals moved to 1.7 inches right at 0915:51.9.

At 0915:51.8, 0915:52.3, and 0915:52.9, the CVR recorded the sound of a thump, a click, and two thumps, respectively. At 0915:54.2, the first officer stated, in a strained voice, "max power." At that point, the airplane was traveling at 240 knots. About 0915:55, the captain asked, "you all right?" to which the first officer replied, "yeah, I'm fine." One second later, the captain stated, "hang onto it. Hang onto it." The CVR recorded the sound of a snap at 0915:56.6, the first officer's statement "let's go for power please" at 0915:57.5, and the sound of a loud thump at 0915:57.7. According to the airplane performance study, the vertical stabilizer's right rear main attachment fitting fractured at 0915:58.4, and the vertical stabilizer separated from the airplane immediately afterward. At 0915:58.5, the CVR recorded the sound of a loud bang. At that time, the airplane was traveling at an airspeed of about 251 knots.

According to the FDR, the rudder pedals moved from 1.7 inches right to 1.7 inches left, 1.7 inches right, 2.0 inches right, 2.4 inches left, and 1.3 inches right between 0915:52 and 0915:58.5. Also, the FDR showed that the control wheel moved 64 to the right at 0915:51.5, 78 (full) to the left at 0915:53.5, 64 to the right at 0915:55.5, and 78 to the left at 0915:56.5.

The airplane performance study estimated that, at 0915:53.2, the rudder was deflected 11 to the left, and the sideslip angle at the airplane's center of gravity (cg) was about 4 to the left (after peaking temporarily at 5 to the left).21 At 0915:56.8, the rudder was deflected 10.2 to the left, and the sideslip angle was about 7 to the left. At 0915:58.4 (the time that the right rear main attachment fitting fractured), the rudder was deflected between 10 and 11 to the right, the sideslip angle was between 11 and 12 to the right, and the airplane experienced a 0.2 G shift to the right in lateral load factor.

The CVR recorded, at 0916:00.0, a sound similar to a grunt and, 1 second later, the first officer's statement, "holy [expletive]." At 0916:04.4, the CVR recorded a sound similar to a stall warning repetitive chime, which lasted for 1.9 seconds. At 0916:07.5, the first officer stated, "what the

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hell	are	we	into	we're	stuck	in i	t." At	091	6:12.8	, th	e captair	ı state	ed, "g	get o	ut o	f it	, get	out of	f
it."	The	CVR	reco	ording	ended	d 2	secon	ıds	later.	The	airplane	was :	locate	ed at	40	34'	37.59"	nort	h
latitu	ıde a	ind 73	3 51'	01.31"	west	long	jitude.	The	accid	ent	occurred	during	g the	hour	s of	day	light.		

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PACIDAL REFORT														
AVIATION	e Type: Accident													
Landing Facility/Approach Information	on													
Airport Name	Airport	ID:	Airport Elevation			way Used	Runwa	ay Lengt	:h	Runw	ay Width			
John F. Kennedy International		JFK		Ft.	Ft. MSL NA									
Runway Surface Type:														
Runway Surface Condition:														
Type Instrument Approach: NONE														
VFR Approach/Landing: None														
Aircraft Information														
Aircraft Manufacturer Airbus Industrie			Model/Series Serial N A300B4-605R 420									Number		
Airworthiness Certificate(s): Transport														
Landing Gear Type: Tricycle														
Homebuilt Aircraft? No Number of Seats: 266 Certified Max Gross Wt. 353500 LBS Number of Eng								ngines: 2						
Engine Type: Turbo Fan	ngine Manufacturer: Model/Seri General Electric CF6									d Power: 00 LBS				
- Aircraft Inspection Information														
Type of Last Inspection									al Time					
Continuous Airworthiness								Ho	ours		37	550 Hours		
- Emergency Locator Transmitter (ELT) Info	rmation													
ELT Installed? No E	LT Operated? No	0			ELT	Aided i	n Locating Ac	cident S	ite? No	)				
Owner/Operator Information														
Registered Aircraft Owner		Str	reet Ac		on C	arter Ri	vd.							
AMERICAN AIRLINES INC		City	4333 Amon Carter Bvd. City St									Zip Code		
		-	Fort Worth TX Street Address									76155		
Operator of Aircraft		Stre	eet Ad	dress										
Same as Reg'd Aircraft Owner	City	City							State TX	•	Zip Code			
Operator Does Business As:  Operator Designator Code: AALR														
- Type of U.S. Certificate(s) Held:														
Air Carrier Operating Certificate(s): Flag Ca	arrier/Domestic													
Operating Certificate:				Operator C	Certific	cate:								
Regulation Flight Conducted Under: Part 1.	21: Air Carrier													
Type of Flight Operation Conducted: Scheo	Juled; Internatio	nal; Pa	sseng	er Only										
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AVIATION Occurrence Type: Accident													
	AVIATI	(M)		Occurren	се Туре: Ас	cident							
First Pilot Information													
Name City State Date of Birth Age											Age		
	42												42
Sex: M	ex: M Seat Occupied: Left Principal Profession: Civilian Pilot Certificate Number:												
Certificate(s): Airline Transport													
Airplane Rating(s): Multi-engine Land													
Rotorcraft/Glider/LTA: None													
Instrument Rating(s): Airplane													
Instructor Rating(s): None													
Type Rating/Endorsement for Accident/Incident Aircraft? Yes  Current Biennial Flight Review? 07/2001													
Medical Cert.: Class 1 Medical Cert. Status: Valid Medicalno waivers/lim. Date of Last Medical Exam: 06/2001													
- Flight Time Matrix  All A/C  This Make and Model			Airplane Single Engine	Airplane Mult-Engine	Nigh	it	Instrumer Actual		trument Simulated		Glider	Lighter Than Air	
Total Time	ime 8050												
Pilot In Con	nmand(PIC)	3448	1723										
Instructor		4.40											
Last 90 Day		146 52											
Last 30 Day		52											
Seatbelt Us		Shou	Ider Harness	Usad2 Na		1.	Toyico	loav Per	formed? Y		9	econd Pilot? Ye	)C
Seatbell Us		31100	idei Hairiess	Osea? NO			TOXICC	Diogy i ei	ioinieu: Ţ	<del>US</del>	136	scond i not: 16	;5
Flight Pla	n/Itinerary												
Type of Flig	ht Plan Filed: IF	R											
Departure F	Point						State	· A	irport Ider	tifier	Depai	rture Time	Time Zone
New York	City						NY	ŀ	KJFK		0914		EST
Destination							State		Airport Ider	itifier			
Santo Do	Santo Domingo KSDQ												
Type of Cle	Type of Clearance: IFR												
Type of Airs	space: Class	A											
Weather	Information												
Source of E	Briefing: Compa	any											
Method of	Briefing: In Pers	son											
				FACTUAI	REPORT	- AVIA	TION	1					Page 3

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	C1 1 BO.												
Weather	Information												
WOF ID	Observation Time	Time Zone	WOF	Elevati	on	WOF Distance From Accident Site							Site
IEIZ	0005	EST		Ε.	MOL								
JFK	0925	Ft.	MSL				NM			De	g. Mag.		
Sky/Lowes	st Cloud Condition: Few					4800 Ft. AC	SL	Condition o	f Ligh	nt: Day			
Lowest Ceiling: None Ft. AGL Visibility: 10							10	SM	Alti	"Hg			
Temperatu	-6 °C	Wind	Wind Direction: 270 Density Altitude: Ft.										
Wind Spee		Weather Condtions at Accident Site: Visual Conditions											
Visibility (F		SM	Intensi	ty of Precipit	ation:								
Restriction	s to Visibility: None												
Type of Pro	Type of Precipitation: None												
Accident	Information												
Aircraft Da	mage: Destroyed		Airc	raft Fire	e: <b>Grou</b> i	nd			Aircraft Exp	losio	n Ground		
Classificati	on: U.S. Registered/U	.S. Soil											
- Injury Su	mmary Matrix	Fatal	Serious	Mino	or	None	TOTAL						
First Pi	ilot	1					1	]					
Second	d Pilot	1					1	1					
Studen	nt Pilot							1					
Flight I	nstructor							1					
Check	Pilot							1					
Flight E	Engineer							1					
Cabin /	Attendants	7					7	1					
Other (	Crew							1					
Passer	ngers	251					251	1					
- TOTAL A	ABOARD -	260					260	1					
Other 0	Ground	5					5	1					
- GRANE	O TOTAL -	265					265	1					

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Administrative	Information
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Investigator-In-Charge (IIC)

Robert Benzon

Additional Persons Participating in This Accident/Incident Investigation:

TR Proven
FAA Coordinator
Federal Aviation Administration
800 Independence Avenue
Washington, DC 20591